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Protecting Industry Under U.S. Trade
Law: Key Issues in Recent ITC
Opinions
I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this Comment is to examine recent opinions of
the International Trade Commission (ITC) pursuant to sections 201-
203 of the Trade Act of 1974 (the "Act").' This legislation confers
authority on the President to take certain measures, subject to ITC
recommendation, to protect complaining industries from an increase
in imports which are a substantial cause of actual or threatened seri-
ous injury.
The Comment is divided into two parts. In the first part, the
procedural provisions of the Act are examined. The legislative his-
tory of the measure and case law are referenced, where possible, to
clarify the meaning of the text.
The key substantive concepts of the Act are analyzed in the sec-
ond part of the article. This analysis consists, first, of a textual exami-
nation with particular emphasis on the legislative history of the Act.
These concepts are then discussed in the context of recent ITC deter-
minations in the cases of NonRubber Footwear2 and Carbon Steel and
Certain Alloy Steel Products (Carbon Steel), 3 to the extent each of
these cases advances an understanding of the key concepts.
The NonRubber Footwear and Carbon Steel cases have been se-
lected for analysis because each represents recent affirmative relief
recommendations by the ITC, and thus provide a relatively complete
discussion of the issues. They also reveal the areas of agreement and
disagreement among the ITC Commissioners concerning the key con-
cepts in the Act.
1. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 2011-2018 (codified as amended at 19
U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253) (1982 & Supp. I 1984)).
2. NonRubber Footwear, USITC Pub. 1717, Inv. No. TA-201-55 (July 1985) [hereinaf-
ter NonRubber Footwear].
3. Carbon Steel and Certain Alloy Steel Products, USITC Pub. 1553, Inv. No. TA-201-
51 (July 1984) [hereinafter Carbon Steel].
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II. PROCEDURAL PROVISIONS OF SECTIONS 201-203.
Under the Act, the purpose of import relief is to facilitate an
orderly adjustment to import competition. 4 An ITC investigation is
required to determine if import relief is justified. An investigation
may be triggered by any one of several parties. It may proceed from a
petition by an entity including a trade association, firm, certified or
recognized union, or group of workers representing an industry. An
investigation must be initiated at the request of the United States
Trade Representative, upon resolution of the House Ways and Means
or Senate Finance Committees, or upon the self motion of the ITC.5
The ITC must then provide the President with a report of its
investigation not later than six months after receiving a petition, re-
quest, or resolution, or after adopting a self motion to investigate. 6
4. Trade Act of 1974 § 201(a)(1), 19 U.S.C. § 2251(a)(1) (1982). A petition for relief
must include a statement of specific purposes for which relief from imports is sought. These
specific purposes may include such objectives as facilitating the orderly transfer of resources to
alternative uses and other means of adjustment to new conditions of competition. Id.
5. Id. at § 201(b)(1), 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(1).
6. Id. at § 201(d)(2), 19 U.S.C. § 2251(d)(2). However, except for good cause, no inves-
tigation may be made on the same subject unless one year has elapsed since the report of a
prior investigation was submitted to the President. Id. at § 201(e), 19 U.S.C. § 2251(e). Addi-
tionally, no investigation is permitted concerning an article for which relief was granted unless
a period of two years has elapsed since the last day of effective relief. Id. at § 203(j), 19 U.S.C
§ 22530).
The issue of re-opening an investigation for good cause was the subject of litigation in
Sneaker Circus, Inc. v. Carter, 457 F. Supp. 771 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 614 F.2d 1290 (2d
Cir. 1979). In Sneaker Circus, importers of nonrubber footwear brought an action to set aside
two orderly marketing agreements (OMAs) negotiated between the United States and Taiwan
and between the United States and Korea. Plaintiffs made three broad allegations to support
their plea. First, they claimed that the ITC good cause determination to re-investigate alleged
injuries to domestic producers did not comply with § 201 (19 U.S.C. § 2251) of the Act. Sec-
ond, they claimed that the President had failed in several ways to comply with §§ 202-203 (19
U.S.C. §§ 2252-2253) of the Act. Last, they claimed that the OMAs violated the Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation between the United States and each country, respec-
tively, as well as § 1 of the Sherman Act. Plaintiffs failed to establish any of these allegations.
On the issue of good cause, plaintiffs had four specific contentions: (1) that the ITC may
only commence an investigation for good cause if the request to do so originates from the
industry; (2) that formal public notice and a hearing are necessary when such a determination
is being considered; (3) that the affirmative determination in this case was not supported by
sufficient evidence; and (4) that notice of the public hearing following the ITC's affirmative
determination was insufficient as to the basis of good cause, the evidence to support it, and the
scope of the evidence considered.
As to its first good cause contention, plaintiffs alleged that the ITC could only commence
a re-investigation if the industry presents substantial new evidence to justify another proceed-
ing. Plaintiffs objected to a Senate Finance Committee resolution which directed the ITC to
commence a new investigation less that one year after the commission had issued a negative
determination on the same subject. This resolution stated "[i]t is the sense of the Committee
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This report must also be made public, subject to confidentiality
requirements.
7
If the ITC makes an affirmative determination for import relief,
it is required to (1) find the amount of the increase in, or imposition
of, any import duty or other import restriction which is necessary to
prevent or remedy the injury; or (2) recommend a provision for ad-
justment assistance if that will effectively remedy the injury.8
Where the ITC makes an affirmative determination, the Presi-
dent must decide within sixty days what relief, if any, he will provide,9
that changed circumstances, including increasing imports and rapidly deteriorating economic
conditions in the domestic footwear industry, constitute good cause within the meaning of
§ 201(e) of the Act." Sneaker Circus, 457 F. Supp. at 783. The ITC subsequently made a
determination that good cause existed to re-open the investigation and did so.
The court held that neither section 201(e) nor the legislative history supported plaintiffs'
contention. To accept plaintiffs' position would have meant that Congress reserved to an in-
dustry the right to request a re-investigation while denying this right to all other persons enti-
tled to request an initial investigation under section 201(b)(1). The court found no evidence
that Congress intended this result. Id. at 783-84. Accordingly, the ITC may determine
whether to commence a re-investigation at the direction of the Senate Finance Committee, and
the ITC determination of whether good cause exists can only be challenged if the ITC did not
comply with procedural requirements. Id. at 785. See also, infra note 12.
The court next found that section 201(e) plainly does not contain a public notice or hear-
ing requirement prior to a good cause determination by the ITC to re-investigate. Id. at 785.
The fact that public notice and a hearing are required in other contexts, e.g., under section
201(c), indicated that "if Congress had intended for the ITC to give notice and hold hearings
before a good cause determination under subsection (e) it would have done so." Id.
Plaintiffs' sufficiency of the evidence contention essentially asked the court to substitute its
judgment for that of the Commission. The offer was declined since it was a matter left by
Congress to the discretion of the ITC. Id. at 787. Accordingly, a review could only consider
whether the ITC determination was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. Such a
review would focus on whether the ITC had borne in mind the relevant factors it was statuto-
rily bound to consider and whether there was clear error. Id. at 788. The Sneaker Circus
court found that statistics considered by the ITC evidencing increased imports, an increase in
the import/consumption ratio, a decrease in domestic production, and a decrease in employ-
ment, were sufficient to show ITC consideration of the relevant factors, and thus, no clear
error was indicated. Id.
Finally, the court could find no language in the Trade Act requiring the ITC to provide
any more information than it did in its notice of re-investigation. Id. As such, plaintiffs'
allegation that notice of ITC's good cause determination was insufficient for lack of informa-
tion was without merit. Id. at 789.
7. Trade Act of 1974 § 201(d)(2), 19 U.S.C. § 2251(d)(2) (1982).
8. Id. at § 201(d)(1), 19 U.S.C. § 2251(d)(1).
9. Id. at § 203(a), 19 U.S.C. § 2253(a). For purposes of import relief, the President
may:
(1) proclaim an increase in, or imposition of, any duty on the article causing or
threatening to cause serious injury to industry;
(2) proclaim a tariff-rate quota on such article;
(3) proclaim a modification of, or imposition of, any quantitative restriction on the
import into the United States of such article;
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and report to Congress on the same day he makes his decision.10 In
determining what relief, if any, he will provide, the President must
consider nine specific factors,' as well as as the national economic
(4) negotiate, conclude, and carry out orderly marketing agreements with foreign
countries limiting the export from foreign countries and the import into the United
States of such articles; or
(5) take any combinations of such actions.
Id. Any of these actions, except the arrangements of orderly marketing agreements, may be
recommended by the ITC. Cf. id. at § 201(d)(1), 19 U.S.C. § 2251(d)(1).
10. Id. at § 203(b)(1), 19 U.S.C. § 2253(b)(3). If, however, the President's action differs
from that recommended by the ITC, the President's report to Congress must state the reason
for the difference. Id. In any event, the President's action should provide relief that is "com-
mensurate with the injury." S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7270 [hereinafter S. REP.].
In Sneaker Circus, plaintiffs alleged that OMAs negotiated with only two countries of the
many who also export nonrubber footwear indicated that the President's actions were not
comensurate with the injury. Plaintiffs also challenged the President's determination that the
1974-1976 time period was the most representative period for assessing injury. The court held
that the phrase "commensurate with the injury" while not in the Trade Act is provided in the
legislative history as a general guide to the President concerning matters essentially turning on
his judgment. Sneaker Circus, 457 F. Supp. at 791. The question of with whom to negotiate
OMAs is a nonjusticiable political question. Id. at 793. Moreover, the relevant time period in
which to assess injury for the purpose of negotiating OMAs is a discretionary matter for the
President under Section 203(d)(2) and, as such, is also non-reviewable. Further, it is a non-
justiciable political question since it goes to the substance of the OMAs. Id.
11. Trade Act of 1974 § 202(c), 19 U.S.C. § 2252(c) (1982). These are:
(1) information and advice from the Secretary of Labor on the extent to which
workers in the industry have applied for, are receiving, or are likely to receive adjust-
ment assistance under part 2 ... or benefits from other manpower programs;
(2) information and advice from the Secretary of Commerce on the extent to which
firms in the industry have applied for, are receiving, or are likely to receive adjust-
ment assistance under parts 3 and 4 of this subchapter;
(3) the probable effectiveness of import relief as a means to promote adjustment,
the efforts being made or to be implemented by the industry concerned to adjust to
import competition, and other considerations relative to the position of the industry
in the Nation's economy;
(4) the effect of import relief on consumers (including the price and availability of
the imported article and the like or directly competitive article produced in the
United States) and on competition in the domestic markets for such articles;
(5) the effect of import relief on the international economic interests of the United
States;
(6) the impact on United States industries and firms as a consequence of any possi-
ble modification of duties or other import restrictions which may result from interna-
tional obligations with respect to compensation;
(7) the geographic concentration of imported products marketed in the United
States;
(8) the extent to which the United States market is the focal point for exports of
such article by reason of restraints on exports of such article to, or on imports of such
article into, third country markets; and
(9) the economic and social costs which would be incurred by taxpayers, communi-
ties, and workers, if import relief were or were not provided.
Id.
While each of these factors will have relative weight in the President's determination,
points 5 and 6 may be particularly important in deciding whether to provide import relief.
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interests of the United States. 12
Under Article 19.3 of GATT, if relief is granted, affected exporting countries may seek com-
pensating tariff benefits from the United States on other products. If such benefits are not
conferred, affected countries are permitted by GATT to retaliate against United States exports
to their countries. J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 565-66 (1969).
Thus, a decision to grant relief may directly affect other United States industries who are likely
to lobby against relief if they believe they will be affected. It is, no doubt, partly because of the
fact that retaliation is permitted under multilateral trade law that the standards for relief under
the Trade Act are high. In consequence, only about 20% of the cases brought for relief have
resulted in relief being granted. Sandler, Primer on United States Trade Remedies, 19 INT'L
LAW. 761, 784 (1985).
12. Trade Act of 1974 § 202(a)(1)(A), 19 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(l)(A) (1982). On the day the
President determines that import relief is not in the national economic interests of the United
States, he must set forth his reasons in his report to Congress. Additionally, the President
must state what other actions he is taking beyond adjustment assistance to help the industry in
question overcome serious injury and to help its workers find productive employment. Id. at
§ 203(b)(2), 19 U.S.C. § 2253(b)(2).
In Maple Leaf Fish Co. v. United States, 596 F. Supp. 1076 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984), aff'd,
762 F.2d 86 (Fed. Cir. 1985), an importer of frozen battered and breaded mushrooms chal-
lenged an assessment of supplemental import duties on that product on the grounds that fro-
zen battered and breaded mushrooms were outside of the scope of the ITC's investigation, and
that, therefore, Presidential action based on this investigation was ultra vires. The court held
that mushrooms are included in item 144.20 of the Tariff Schedules of the United States, and
all procedures taken pursuant to the ITC's and the President's actions were proper. Id. at
1082.
This case reviewed the procedural authority granted to the ITC and the President in
taking protective actions. In undertaking this review, the court relied on two prior cases,
Florsheim Shoe Co. v. United States, 744 F.2d 787 (Fed. Cir. 1984) and Norwegian Nitrogen
Products v. United States, 288 U.S. 294 (1933).
In Maple Leaf, the court reviewed the validity of action by the ITC and the President
under authority delegated by Congress. In dicta, the court found that section 202(b)(1) granted
the President expansive discretion in import relief matters since he is permitted to deny import
relief if it is "not in the national economic interest." Maple Leaf, 596 F. Supp. at 1079. Thus,
the national economic interest, as determined by the President, may override any weight at-
tributable to the nine factors the President is required to consider under section 202(c).
Similarly, under section 201(b), the ITC may consider all economic factors it deems rele-
vant in making its import relief report, in addition to those factors prescribed by Congress.
Accordingly, the factors cited by Congress in its delegations of essentially legislative authority
to the ITC and the President are mandatory guidelines, but, the court said, quoting Florsheim,
"these facts do not amount to a formula for the decision making process which can be judi-
cially reviewed." Id. When the process of decision making is reviewed, that inquiry is limited
to: "(1) whether proper statutory procedures ... [are] followed; (2) whether the statutory
language was properly construed; and (3) whether the action taken was within the scope of
delegated authority." Id.
In Florsheim, plaintiff challenged the Custom Service's denial of plaintiff's petition
against the classification of buffalo and goat leather as dutiable merchandise. The denials were
made on the basis of certain Executive Orders under which the President withdrew free treat-
ment. The court found that section 504(a) (19 U.S.C. § 2464) confers plenary authority on the
President to withdraw duty free treatment based on his consideration of certain enumerated
factors, which, if invoked, is sufficient to uphold denial of plaintiff's petition. Relying on
United States v. Bush & Co., 310 U.S. 371 (1940), the Florsheim court pointed out that in
198 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. J. [Vol. 9:193
However, a Presidential determination denying relief, or granting
relief differing from that recommended by the ITC, is subject to Con-
gressional override. An override requires a joint resolution of Con-
gress made within ninety days of receipt of the President's report.1 3 If
Congress overrides the executive recommendation, the President is re-
quired within thirty days to proclaim the imposition or increase of
import duties, or other restrictions recommended by the ITC.'
4
matters where a public officer has been duly authorized to take specified action requiring his
judgment as to the necessity of appropriateness of action, the judgment of that officer as to the
facts calling for action is not subject to review. Florsheim, 744 F.2d at 795-96.
Notwithstanding this deference to the judgment of an officer to whom legislative responsi-
bility has been delegated, however, the Maple Leaf court stated that substantive finds are sub-
ject to judicial review. Maple Leaf, 596 F.2d at 1081. The Maple Leaf court relied on the
holding in Norwegian Nitrogen Products for its conclusion.
In Norwegian Nitrogen Products, plaintiffs refused to reveal production cost information
regarding Tariff Commission hearings to increase duties on plaintiffs' product, but sought to
have revealed domestic producer information given in confidence to the Commission. The
Court determined that whenever a hearing is required by the Commission, the hearing must be
fair. What is fair, however, may vary from case to case. In this case, the Commission's refusal
to reveal domestic producer cost information was not arbitrary because it created neither hard-
ship for domestic producers nor prejudice to foreign producers, the detailed information was
not essential to the plaintiffs' case, and plaintiffs' refusal to provide production information
amounted to an obstruction of the Commission's purposes. Norwegian Nitrogen Products, 288
U.S. at 321-24.
The Maple Leaf court found Norwegian Nitrogen Products analogous to its case. Thus,
although ITC determinations are not themselves final, and therefore not subject to the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 557(c)(3)(A) (1982), general principles of judicial review
and section 201(d) of the Act require that the ITC articulate the basis for its recommendation
so a court may conduct a meaningful review to determine if substantial evidence supports the
ITC recommendation. While such a review will not be based upon the substantial evidence
test, the ITC's report must at least fairly apprise the President, interested parties, and the
public of the reasons for its determinations. Such revelation is necessary to meet the implied
standard of fairness required in every administrative hearing. Maple Leaf, 596 F. Supp. at
1081.
13. Trade Act of 1974 § 203(c)(1), 19 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (1982), amended by Trade and
Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, § 248(a)(1), 98 Stat. 2998. This amendment for over-
ride was made in response to the Supreme Court decision in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919
(1983). In Chadha, the plaintiff appealed the validity of a resolution by the House of Repre-
sentatives purporting to invalidate an action of the Executive Branch which allowed an alien to
remain in the United States. The Court held that a one-house resolution overriding an Execu-
tive action is unconstitutional. This decision is based on the principle that actions taken pursu-
ant to the legislative function require passage by both Houses of Congress and presentment to
the President. Id. at 954-55.
14. Trade Act of 1974 § 203(c)(2), 19 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (Supp. II 1984). Section
203(d) provides that tariffs may be raised to a level not to exceed 50% ad valorem above the
presently existing rate, e.g., if the present tariff rate is 5%, it may not exceed 55%. Addition-
ally, any quantitative restraint proclaimed must allow importation of a quantity or value of an
article which is not less than that entered during the most recent period representative of
imports of the article.
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Where the ITC recommends adjustment assistance as relief, the Presi-
dent is required to direct the Secretaries of Commerce and Labor to
give expeditious consideration to the matter.' 5
Any relief provided is temporary and may not exceed a period of
five years. 16 Even when relief is granted, however, the guiding pur-
pose of permitting time for beleaguered domestic producers to adjust
remains operative. Accordingly, if relief is granted for more than
three years, it must, if feasible, be accompanied by a phase-out of re-
lief commencing not later than the last day of the third year after
which relief is granted.' 7 Such relief may, however, be extended for
one three-year period at the same level in effect immediately before
the extension provided the continued relief is in the economic inter-
ests of the United States.' 8 In making this judgment, the President is
required to consider the views of the ITC' 9 and those factors which
otherwise govern his actions.20
Finally, any implemented relief may be reduced or terminated
early if the President determines that it is in the national interest of
the United States. 2' As a condition precedent to this action, the Presi-
dent must receive advice from the ITC and the Secretaries of Labor
and Commerce. 22
III. SUBSTANTIVE CRITERIA FOR IMPORT RELIEF UNDER
SECTIONS 201-203.
Under the Act, an ITC investigation is initiated to determine
"whether an article is being imported into the United States in such
increased quantities as to be a substantial cause of serious injury, or
the threat thereof, to the domestic industry producing an article like
or directly competitive with the imported article."'23 The terms "in-
dustry," "increased imports," "serious injury," "threat thereof," and
"substantial cause" are the key elements of this determination. These
expressions are examined seriatim, and in connection with the cases of
NonRubber Footwear and Carbon Steel, as appropriate.
15. Id. at § 202(b)(2), 19 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2).
16. Id. at § 203(h)(1), 19 U.S.C. § 2253(h)(1).
17. Id. at § 203(h)(2), 19 U.S.C. § 2253(h)(2).
18. Id. at § 203(h)(3), 19 U.S.C. § 2253(h)(3).
19. Id. at § 203(i)(2), 19 U.S.C. § 2253(i)(2).
20. Id. at § 202(c), 19 U.S.C. § 2252(c); see supra note 11.
21. Trade Act of 1974 § 203(h)(4), 19 U.S.C. § 2253(h)(4) (1982).
22. Id.
23. Id. at § 201(b)(1), 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(1), amended by Interest and Dividend Tax
Compliance Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-67, § 214(f), 97 Stat. 393.
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A. The Definition of "Industry"
1. Statutory Framework
An "industry" is limited to producers located in the insular
United States.24 Beyond this general limitation, the definition of "in-
dustry" is flexible. Section 201(b)(1) provides that an "industry" is
one which produces an article "like or directly competitive with" the
allegedly harmful imports.
The terms "like" and "directly competitive with" are not synon-
ymous. "Like" products are those which are substantially identical in
inherent characteristics, having similar appearance, quality, and tex-
ture.25 "Directly competitive" products are those which are function-
ally equivalent substitutes for commercial purposes. 26 The most
appropriate article of reference for determining a like or directly com-
petitive product is the finished product itself, and not its component
parts.
27
Notwithstanding this general definition of "industry," the ITC
has discretion in three cases to narrow its focus in identifying an in-
dustry.28 First, where a domestic producer also imports a like or di-
rectly competitive product, the ITC may treat only its domestic
production as part of the domestic industry.29 Second, where a do-
mestic producer makes more than one product, the ITC may treat
only that portion or division of the producer which produces the like
or directly competitive product as part of the industry.30 These two
distinctions are aimed at more precisely identifying injurious imports
since consolidated income statements of multi-product or multina-
tional producers may obscure losses as to their like or directly com-
petitive product, and may distort the assessment of injury to smaller
24. Id.
25. S. REP., supra note 10, at 7265.
26. Id. at 7266.
27. In United Shoe Workers of Am. v. Bedell, 506 F.2d 174 (D.C. Cir. 1974), a union
sought a declaratory judgment that adjustment assistance was available to union members as a
result of their firm's product being injured by imports that contained their firm's product as a
component. After the union succeeded in the district court, the court of appeals reversed. The
appellate court reasoned that the provision of adjustment assistance was not intended to be
available as a result of injuries due to imports where the imports are not a distinct article.
Thus, imported shoes were not "like" domestically produced components of such shoes within
the meaning of the statute. Id. at 186-87.
28. Trade Act of 1974 § 201(b)(3), 19 U.S.C. 2251(b)(3) (1982).
29. Id. at § 201(b)(3)(A), 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(3)(A).
30. Id. at § 201(b)(3)(B), 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(3)(B).
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producers. 3'
Finally, where domestic producers are concentrated in a limited
geographic area of the United States, the ITC may treat only that
segment of production that originates in that area as part of the do-
mestic industry producing a like or directly competitive product, sub-
ject to three qualifications. 32 First, the production in the geographic
area must amount to a substantial portion of the national industry.
Second, such producers must primarily serve the market in the geo-
graphic area. Third, the imports must be concentrated in the geo-
graphic area.
2. The Case of NonRubber Footwear33
The Commission unanimously agreed that athletic and non-ath-
letic footwear together made up one nonrubber footwear industry for
purposes of this investigation. Respondents, athletic footwear produ-
cers, argued that athletic and non-athletic footwear are not com-
pletely interchangeable because athletic footwear can be used for non-
athletic purposes, but the converse was not usually true. Since these
types of footwear were not consistently interchangeable, they urged,
the two types of footwear were not directly competitive products.
34
Chairwoman Stern noted that these products are not "like"
31. S. REP., supra note 10, at 7266. Additionally, the ITC should, where possible, ex-
clude profits from captive imports by operators of domestic industry. Such profits do not
necessarily reflect the conditions of production operations in the United States. CONF. REP.
No. 1156, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5259
[hereinafter CONF. REP.].
32. Trade Act of 1974 § 201(b)(3)(C), 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (b)(3)(C) (1982). The legislative
history of this provision is silent. Substantively, it appears to be a clarification that in identify-
ing an industry, reference may be made to the special needs and activities of particular geo-
graphic areas, and that an industry need not be national in scope.
Such closer focus would prevent distortion stemming from the use of aggregate industry
data on a national scale when determining if serious injury has occurred or is imminent. This
is particularly important when a geographic region is especially reliant on a certain industry.
In cases where other, extra-regional operators in the industry are competing successfully, that
success could prevent relief for that portion of the industry in the especially vulnerable region.
33. See supra note 2. This investigation was initiated upon a resolution by the Senate
Finance Committee. See supra note 6. This resolution was made in response to a prior ITC
negative determination made one year earlier. In making an affirmative determination in this
subsequent case, the ITC cited changed facts as the basic rationale for their reversal.
NonRubber Footwear, supra note 2, at 1. In that case, Commissioners Eckes, Lodwick, and
Rohr found that increased imports were the substantial cause of actual serious injury to the
industry; Chairwoman Stem and Vice Chairman Liebeler found that increased imports were
the substantial cause of threatened serious injury to the industry. Both findings, however,
justify the recommendation to grant import relief.
34. NonRubber Footwear, USITC Pub. 1717, Inv. No. TA-201-55, 8-9 (July 1985).
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products, citing various criteria such as: the significant differences in
the establishments used for the production of these two products; dis-
tinct research and development required; and different technology
and worker skills employed.35 However, athletic and non-athletic
footwear were found to be directly competitive since there was "essen-
tial interchangeability" in terms of the uses to which the two types of
footwear were put.3 6 This was based on a finding that substantial por-
tions of both types of footwear were purchased and used in contexts in
which either would be suitable.3 7 Therefore, athletic and non-athletic
footwear were found to be substantially equivalent for commercial
purposes, i.e. directly competitive under the Act.3 8
Commissioner Eckes pointed out that to assume "directly com-
petitive" means "two-way substitution," is to argue that athletic and
non-athletic footwear are "like" products, since " 'like' products pos-
sess the same characteristics and, thus, are necessarily equivalent. ' 39
This would effectively make the statutory language of "directly com-
petitive" wholly redundant. This plainly was not the intent of
Congress.
Finally, Commissioner Lodwick contributed his criteria for de-
termining if there was one industry in this case.40 These criteria over-
lapped with those of Chairwoman Stem, but, in addition,
Commissioner Lodwick distinguished establishments by firms and
plants, and suggested that whether the products are distributed
through the same retail outlets may be material.41
3. The Case of Carbon Steel 42
The threshhold issue of defining "industry" in this investigation
35. Id.
36. Id. at 10; cf id. at 27, 94 (findings of Commissioners Liebeler and Rohr, respectively,
which are in accord with the conclusions of Chairwoman Stem).
37. Id. at 10.
38. Id. at 9; see also supra text accompanying note 26.
39. NonRubber Footwear, supra note 2, at 58.
40. Id. at 80-81.
41. Id.
42. See supra note 3. This controversy arose from a petition by the United Steelworkers
of America, the AFL/CIO/CLC, and Bethlehem Steel Corporation. The scope of the
investigation concerned the effect of imports of nine carbon steel products produced by the
domestic industry. By a 3-2 vote, relief was recommended for five products (ingots, blooms,
billets, slabs, and semi-finished sheet bars; sheets and strip; wire and wire products; plates; and
structural shapes and units). By a unanimous vote, no relief was recommended for three
products (wire rods; railway type products; and bars). By a 3-2 vote, no relief was
recommended for one product (pipes and tubes). Concerning semi-finished products,
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focused upon the the production facilities and processes of domestic
producers, as well as the markets for their products.43 The range of
articles included in this investigation consisted of ingots, blooms, bil-
lets, slabs, and semi-finished steel bars, sheets and strip, wire and wire
products, plates, structural shapes and units, wire rods, railway type
products, bars, and pipes and tubes.
Petitioners, unions and domestic producers, maintained that
there was a single industry comprised of all basic steel mill products
and certain "first tier" products. To support this claim, they argued
that the products in question shared the following common character-
istics: (1) a common technological and metallurgical basis; (2) pro-
duction facilities shared in whole or in part; (3) common melt
facilities; (4) ease of varying product mix; (5) unitary economies of
production; and (6) a high degree of vertical integration among some
producers. In addition, petitioners observed that two-thirds of the
cost of production of finished products consisted of raw steel produc-
tion. Finally, they argued that the existence of a continuum of prod-
ucts lacking clear differentiating characteristics makes a single
industry approach realistic.44 Thus, the "industry" definition offered
would encompass all basic steel producers, as well as a number of
finished product producers who use basic steel as raw material.
Respondents, importers and some domestic manufacturers,
countered by referring to the legislative history of section 201(b)(1) of
the Act which requires that the products and imports must share in-
herent characteristics or be of like appearance. 45 They also argued
that production and marketing practices showed there were multiple
industries.46 Further, respondents maintained that some of these
products were manufactured abroad by United States firms and that
there can be no finding of injury for such products.47 Finally, respon-
dents observed that section 201 is derived from Article 19 of the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), under which escape
from import competition is only permitted for "an article" and not a
Commissioners Lodwick and Rohr found that domestic industry faced a threat of serious
injury, and Commissioner Eckes found it had suffered actual serious injury. Concerning the
remaining products for which relief was recommended, these three Commissioners agreed on a
finding of actual serious injury.
43. Carbon Steel, supra note 3, at 12-13.
44. Id. at 13-14.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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"class of articles."' 48
In its analysis, the Commission considered not only differences in
products, but also differences in the types of firms producing these
products. Since product diversity was self-evident, differences in the
types of firms manufacturing the products assumed greater
importance.
The largest fully integrated firms were characterized by the
whole array of steel-making technology.49 The firms which are con-
centrated in the Great Lakes region also tended to own and operate
mines providing raw materials. 50 Significantly, a number of the large
integrated producers had diversified away from their traditional steel-
making business into wholly unrelated areas. 51
Non-integrated producers, in contrast, operated on a smaller, re-
gional scale. Their steel-making technological base was decidedly
more limited than the integrated producers' capital plant. Typically,
these firms had very limited raw steel production capability, and re-
lied on independent providers of raw materials to produce their more
limited range of products.5 2
Additionally, there were a number of non-steel-making firms af-
fected by this case. These firms shared few similarities with the
smaller steel producers, having different capital plant and producing
different products. 5
3
Finally, although there was a class of products insofar as each
product was primarily made of steel, the Commission found that the
semi-finished and finished products were not so closely related as to
justify finding a single class category. 54 This conclusion followed
from the varied production facilities and processes used to produce
each product, as well as the different markets into which the products
were placed.55 Given the diversity of products and the various types
of firms producing these products, the Commission found nine indus-
tries were present, one for each article under consideration. 56
48. Id.
49. Id. at 15-16.
50. Id. at 16.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 17.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 18.
55. Id.
56. The Commission's determination on this issue was unanimous. See id. at 133 (finding
by Commissioner Liebeler).
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A comparison of these two cases reveals that the ITC will use,
within statutory bounds, whatever criteria seems most appropriate for
defining the industry in question. Where there are similar, though not
identical, products, the definition of the industry will turn on the de-
gree of interchangeability between the two products. Where a large
number of products are under investigation, closer examination will
be made of the organization of the industry to determine if the nature
of the products and their manufacture require a unified organizational
structure. If so, the various products may be treated as a class of
articles for purposes of comparison to allegedly harmful imports. If a
unified organizational structure is not a necessity, the products and
the firms producing them will be treated as several industries for the
purpose of comparison.
These approaches are reasonable. Since comparison is essential
to determine whether there is an injury, discrete industries must be
identified before the comparison can be made to discrete foreign in-
dustries. This identity may be found either in the uses to which the
products are put, or in the economic requirements of efficient organi-
zation. Depending on the specific items under investigation, either
measure would satisfactorily identify an industry.
B. The Requirement of "Increased Imports"
1. Statutory Framework
The text of section 201 refers to "increased imports" in two
places. This fact has given rise to disagreement among ITC Commis-
sioners as to which provision governs their determinations. A com-
parison of the two provisions reveals the source of the controversy.
Section 201(b)(1) of the Act provides, in pertinent part, that the
Commission shall determine "whether an article is being imported
into the United States in such increased quantities as to be a substan-
tial cause of serious injury or a threat thereof . . . . ",57 Section
201(b)(2)(C) provides that in making its determination the Commis-
sion shall consider "with respect to substantial cause, an increase in
imports (either actual or relative to domestic production) and a decline
in the proportion of the domestic market supplied by domestic
producers. 58
The difference between these two provisions is material. If sec-
57. Trade Act of 1974 § 201(b)(1), 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(1) (1982) (emphasis added).
58. Id. at § 201(b)(2)(c), 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(2)(c) (Supp. II 1984) (emphasis added).
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tion 201(b)(1) controls, no relief may be granted unless imports have
increased in absolute terms. If imports have not increased, there is no
need to make a causation determination by examining changes in
market share since no relief is possible. If section 201(b)(2)(C) con-
trols, whenever there is an increase in market share of foreign suppli-
ers, relief may be granted, assuming all other criteria for relief are
met. This will be true even when demand falls, if foreign supply falls
more slowly than domestic supply. The provision of two clauses in
section 201 might facially suggest a two-part test is being suggested.
In fact, there is only one test, a reduction in market share and domes-
tic producers. This is revealed by considering the logical possibilities
present.
The case of an actual increase in imports is clear. When imports
grow faster than domestic supply, there is an actual increase in mar-
ket share of foreign producers. This is true whether demand increases
or remains steady. When demand falls, if foreign supply remains
steady, there is a relative increase in market share of foreign produ-
cers. Similarly, when demand and supply fall, and domestic supply
declines faster than foreign supply, there is also relative increase in the
market share of foreign producers. Thus, in all cases, the key referent
is the prior existing market share of domestic producers. Conse-
quently, whenever the domestic producer market share falls, imports
may be found to be the substantial cause of serious injury or the threat
thereof.
The issue of which provision should control ITC determinations
is not easily resolved. Those who maintain that there can be no relief
unless imports have increased absolutely in number rely on the plain
language of section 201(b)(1),59 and its legislative history.6° Those
who hold that any loss of market share by domestic producers may
suffice for relief rely on the plain language of section 201, taken as a
whole. 61 These parties also rely on both the legislative history of sec-
tion 201,62 and the history of United States escape clause legislation.63
Thus, until Congress speaks or there is an established, uniform view
among ITC Commissioners, whether an absolute or relative increase
in imports may justify import relief remains an open question.
59. See infra text accompanying note 76.
60. See infra text accompanying note 77.
61. See infra text accompanying note 66.
62. See infra text accompanying note 69.
63. See infra text accompanying note 71.
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2. The Case of Carbon Steel
This case has significant precedential value concerning the issue
of increased imports. By a 4-1 vote, 64 the ITC for the first time rec-
ommended import relief when imports had not increased in absolute
terms.65 Several arguments were used to support the majority view
that a relative increase in imports may justify relief.
The first argument was based on statutory construction. The
majority noted the language of section 201(b)(2)(C) which includes in
the definition of "increased imports" the parenthetical phrase "either
actual or relative to domestic production. ' 66 Section 201(b)(1) was
deemed to provide merely the basic test for import relief. That sec-
tion must be read by reference to the more specific factors provided by
Congress for determining if the test is met, i.e., those contained in
section 201(b)(2)(C). 67 Thus, the majority found it logical that Con-
gress would define the term "increased imports" in the same subsec-
tion in which it enumerated the factors to be considered when
determining causation. 68
Second, the majority found nothing in the legislative history of
the Act which evinces a Congressional intent to employ a two-step
test, is viz., first determine if imports have actually increased, and, if
so, then determine if the increase is actual or relative to domestic pro-
duction.69 Although the legislative history is clear that the Senate
preferred an absolute increase to justify relief, the Senate also ac-
cepted the House version of section 201(b)(2)(C) which provides the
actual or relative test. 70 Thus, the majority found no clear basis in the
legislative history that an absolute increase in imports is necessary for
relief.
Third, the majority also relied on the history of United States
escape clause legislation which is traceable to Article 19 of GATT.
From the earliest days of GATT, it was clear that relief action could
64. Vice Chairman Liebeler dissented.
65. Carbon Steel, supra note 3, at 133; the five categories of products of which imports
actually decreased were: plates, structural shapes and units, pipes and tubes, railway type
products, and bars. cf. supra note 42.
66. Carbon Steel, supra note 3, at 25.
67. Id. at 25-26.
68. Id. at 26.
69. Id.
70. Compare S.REP. supra note 10, at 7266 with CONF.REP. No. 1644, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7379.
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be premised on a relative increase in imports.71 This notion was in-
corporated into United States law in section 7 of the Trade Expansion
Act of 1951.72 This provision was later strengthened in the Trade Ex-
pansion Act of 196273 which provided that only an absolute increase
in imports would justify relief. However, when the Trade Act of 1974
was drafted, Congress found this standard too rigorous and sought a
relaxation. This relaxation was accomplished by using language from
the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951 which provided for relief
if the increase in imports is "actual or relative to domestic produc-
tion."' 74 Thus, the history of the escape clause confirmed the majority
belief that Congress intended that a relative increase in imports may
justify relief.
Finally, the majority argued that the provision of two separate
tests for increased imports and causation would create an inconsis-
tency with the basic purpose of the statute, which is to prevent or
remedy injury while facilitating an orderly adjustment to new condi-
tions of competition. 75 Since an industry may be in need of relief even
when imports are declining, as when there are severely depressed
market conditions, the requirement of an absolute increase in imports
would defeat this purpose.
The lone dissenter on this point, Vice Chairman Liebeler, main-
tained that increased imports, pursuant to section 201(b)(1), is a
threshold requirement in every ITC determination. If imports have
not increased in absolute terms, under this view, section 201(b)(2)(C)
need not be considered as the ITC must make a negative
determination.
76
This view was supported by a construction of the statute. Not
only is section 201(b)(1) clear on its face, but when Congress wished
the ITC to consider relative increases in imports, it used the precise
language to so indicate.77 Such precision was used by Congress in
identifying the causation requirement for relief from imports in sec-
tion 201(b)(2)(C), but such language was not used in establishing the
71. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 2 BISD, 44-45 (1952); J. JACKSON, supra
note 11, at 558.
72. Pub. L. No. 50, 65 Stat. 74.
73. Pub. L. No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 876.
74. Carbon Steel, supra note 3, at 26. But see infra note 122.
75. Carbon Steel, supra note 3, at 26; see also supra note 4.
76. Carbon Steel, supra note 3, at 133-34.
77. Id. at 134.
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initial increased imports requirement in section 201(b)(1). 78 The fair
inference to be drawn is that Congress intended that there must be an
absolute increase in imports to satisfy the increased import require-
ment of section 201(b)(1).
Finally, this view was supported by the argument that the re-
quirement of increased imports reflected Congress' intent to balance
domestic and foreign policy considerations. 79 Accordingly, if the ITC
were to find grounds for import relief based upon a relative increase in
imports, it would effectively be substituting its judgment for that of
Congress in this delicate area.
These discrepant interpretations of the standards upon which im-
port relief may be conferred create troubling uncertainty for those
seeking relief. Since the statute and the intent of Congress on this
issue are not clear, perhaps the most appropriate touchstone for deter-
mining the better view is the express purpose of the Act.
The design of the Act is to permit the orderly adjustment by an
industry to new conditions of competition. Thus, it is not "protec-
tionist" in the sense of seeking to arrest or reverse change. Rather,
the Act implicitly endorses change wrought by competition and aims
only to moderate its pace in certain conditions. In practical terms,
the Act appears to be founded on the recognition that modem means
of mass production can create large volumes of goods very quickly. 80
When placed in the market, the disruptive effects can abruptly swell
unemployment and its collateral problems. The Act was crafted to
mitigate or avoid such results temporarily.
Undesirable effects can occur even while an industry is undergo-
ing consolidation. The fact that industry consolidation may be due to
competitive imports is, standing alone, not sufficient to justify import
relief. However, if imports continue to make it impossible for the do-
mestic industry in question to make an orderly adjustment despite a
decline in the absolute numbers of foreign products in the U.S., the
Act, by reference to its purpose, should be temporarily utilized to
moderate the pace of change until order is restored.
The notion that the Act represents a Congressional balance of
78. Id. at n.9.
79. Id. at 133-34. Unfortunately, no direct authority is cited for this argument. In con-
trapoint, it can be argued that since the ITC may consider any factors it deems relevant in
making its determination, and since political considerations are not expressly precluded by the
statute, the ITC may consider foreign policy factors. See infra text following note 80.
80. See GATT Doc. SR. 15/17, at 153 (1959) (cited in J. JACKSON, supra note 11, at
570).
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foreign and domestic policy seems unpersuasive. Under Article 19 of
GATT, the United States recognizes the principle of import relief
founded upon a relative increase in imports. Thus, it would be sur-
prising for the Congress to provide a remedy that was not essentially
parallel to that under the rules of international trade. Further, even
when relief is recommended on the basis of a relative increase in im-
ports, the President may prevent embarrassment or difficulties for the
United States by denying the recommended relief. The President's act
may, of course, be overridden by Congress, which retains the power
to reset the balance of foreign and domestic policy as it sees fit. Thus,
it would not appear that the ITC can practically substitute its judg-
ment for that of Congress.
C. The Requirement of "Serious Injury"
1. Statutory Framework
United States trade legislation does not define this critical term.
Rather, Congress has provided a list of indicia which may evidence
injury.81 However, the presence or absence of any of these factors is
not dispositive that serious injury has occurred. 82 Additionally, the
ITC is authorized to consider any other factors it deems relevant.8 3
81. Trade Act of 1974 § 201(b)(2)(A), 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(2)(A) (1982). These factors
include the significant idling of productive facilities in the industry; the inability of a significant
number of firms to operate on a reasonable level of profit; and significant unemployment or
under-employment within the industry.
Additionally, the ITC is now also required to consider the closing of plants and underu-
tilization of production facilities in determining if there has been a significant idling of produc-
tive facilities in an industry. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, Title II, § 249,
98 Stat. 2998.
This latest clarification reflects Congressional dissatisfaction with the negative injury de-
termination made by the ITC in the 1984 NonRubber Footwear case. See supra note 33. In
that case, the ITC had, in the view of Congress, read section 201 of the Act too restrictively.
Accordingly, Congress has now said that an industry's profit data is not dispositive for finding
serious injury. Rather, the ITC must look deeper and consider plant closings and employment
trends in assessing the conditions of an industry. This requirement has been imposed because
it is possible that a surviving industry may be profitable, even though a large number of firms
have closed. CONF. REP., supra note 31, at 5258-59.
82. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, Title II, § 249(1), 98 Stat. 2998.
83. Trade Act of 1974 § 201(b)(2), 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(2) (Supp. 11 1984). Where ineffi-
cient producers are cutting back on production, as indicated by their individual statistical
profile relative to the aggregate statistical profile of the industry, such cutbacks may be indica-
tive of industry consolidation. Usually, consolidation is considered positive since the market
system is geared to disfavor inefficient producers. But where cutbacks show clear negative
deviations from historical patterns, there is actual or encroaching industry depression. These
conditions would present a stronger case for finding serious injury since it may indicate unduly
voluminous, competitive imports. In such cases, the increase of imports is likely harmful since
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Hence, the ITC has considerable room for judgment to determine if
serious injury occurred, especially since each indicator is qualified by
the requirement that it be of "significant" importance.
Nonetheless, the indicia which the ITC are required to consider
readily lend themselves to quantification, thus providing a clear basis
for judgment. Utilization and profitability ratios are standard compo-
nents of financial analysis for assessing the health of a business or
industry. Similarly, plant closings and unemployment statistics are
readily obtainable data which may show the actual or projected
health of an industry depending on which producers are cutting back
operations.
To be sure, this reliance on qualified data will not remove the
element of judgment concerning what is a reasonable profit level,
what is significant under-employment, or what is an appropriate plant
utilization rate. But it does provide a factual basis for any ITC judg-
ment concerning injury, and would appear necessary to withstand ju-
dicial review.84
2. The Case of NonRubber Footwear
Substantively, the key issue is the degree of injury necessary to be
deemed "serious." On this point, there is general agreement among
ITC Commissioners that the availability of a remedy requires that the
injury be serious indeed. Metaphorically borrowing from the fields of
medicine and biology, the ITC suggests "serious" means a "crippling
or mortal injury" that may become a "terminal injury" if import
it would appear to undermine the domestic industry's ability to make orderly adjustment. See
supra note 4.
One way to determine whether there is on-going consolidation or encroaching industry
depression is to examine industry production data and financial market attitudes toward the
industry in question. If period to period the data shows a gradual reduction of production, it
would appear to be a case of orderly consolidation. In this case, orderly adjustment is appar-
ently being made. If, however, production cutbacks are sharp, and show little or no upward
variation, the inference to be drawn is that imports are increasing too rapidly to permit adjust-
ment. In this case, domestic producer market share is being lost before any effective effort can
be made to become more efficient.
To confirm whatever finding is made, reference may be made to the ability of the industry
in question to attract capital. Investors and lenders do their own financial analyses prior to
committing capital. Since these parties are afforded no protection under the Act, their self-
interested, independent views give probative weight to their professional estimates of the abil-
ity of the domestic industry to compete effectively.
84. See supra note 12.
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trends continue or "extinction, or something close to it. ' '85
Beyond these generalizations, there were two views on how to
assess serious injury. Each view considered the statutory criteria, but
divided on the judgment of whether there was serious injury, and the
related question of how best to assess industry profit data.
Concerning profit data, there are three possible groups of mate-
rial from which an assessment can be made: (1) use only aggregate
industry data, or (2) use aggregate industry data according to the pro-
duction size of the firm, or (3) use aggregate industry data and disag-
gregated data according to individual firms. Depending on which
measure is used, judgment may vary accordingly.
In Vice Chairman Liebeler's view, a 6.2% decline in capacity
from 1980 to 1984 was not considered a "significant idling of produc-
tion facilities."'8 6 In the same period, there was also a 25% decline in
the number of plants, utilization rates fell by 7.9%, and the constant
dollar value of shipments fell from 4.62 billion dollars to 3.42 billion
dollars.8 7 These facts, while significant to this Commissioner, were
nonetheless deemed insufficient to constitute "serious injury."
88 Simi-
larly, a 16% decline in production and related worker employment in
this period were held not indicative of "serious injury." 89
Concerning profitability analysis, Vice Chairman Liebeler fo-
cused on aggregate industry data and data based on production size of
firms. This information showed that only the smallest firms, account-
ing for less than 2% of domestic production, operated at a loss
amounting to an average of 3% of net sales.90 However, firms pro-
ducing 4 million or more pairs of shoes annually, representing 59% of
domestic production, showed good operating profits, albeit declining
from 11.4% in 1983 to 7.4% in 1984. The relative stability of key
industry financial ratios was also noted by this Commissioner. 9'
Thus, traditional financial indicators did not show "serious in-
jury." Rather, financial analysis revealed that economies of scale are
an important factor in the nonrubber footwear industry, with firms
producing 1 million pairs of shoes or more annually being most able
85. NonRubber Footwear, USITC Pub. 1717, Inv. No. TA-201-55, 69 (July 1985); see
also id. at 32.
86. Id. at 35.
87. Id. at 35-36.
88. Id. at 38; see also supra text accompanying note 84.
89. NonRubber Footwear, USITC Pub. 1717, Inv. No. TA-201-55, 35-38 (July 1985).
90. Id. at 36.
91. Id. at 37-38.
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to compete.92 Accordingly, the "shake-out" of smaller producers is to
be expected when industry consolidation is on-going and is, itself, in-
sufficient to justify relief from imports.
93
The essence and strength of this financial analysis is its primary,
but not exclusive, concentration of analysis on segments of the indus-
try according to producer size rather than individual firms. It thus
takes into account the established principle of economies of scale
which identifies the most appropriate size for a production plant, and
leads to the most efficient allocation of resources. 94
This approach also impliedly recognizes that the statistical meas-
ures of small, non-competitive firms may unduly influence aggregate
data, and may, in turn, inappropriately influence judgment. If, there-
fore, relief were afforded either on the basis of aggregate data, or ag-
gregate data and individual firm statistics, larger, more efficient firms
would reap the benefit of unneeded relief. Consequently, the end re-
sult would be the maintenance of uneconomic firms and possibly the
undermining of the competitive vitality of larger firms.
In the judgment of three Commissioners, the nonrubber footwear
industry had suffered serious injury. Unemployment figures, consid-
ered by gross numbers as well as by year-to-year variation, showed a
steady increase since 1981, with an accelerating jump in the 1983-
1984 period.95 The idling of production facilities also showed a steady
rise over the 1983-1984 period, with the increase accelerating in the
1980-1984 period.96 Similarly, accelerated declines were evident in
production capacity and utilization rates, and the number of plant
closures increased over the period covered by the investigation. These
facts indicated that industry consolidation, previously orderly, was
becoming a "rout. '97
Profitability figures were considered on an aggregate and individ-
ual firm basis, 98 and then compared to the U.S. manufacturing indus-
tries profitability average.99 This analysis displayed an accelerated
increase in the number of firms reporting losses, and the number of
92. Id. at 37.
93. Id. at 37-38.
94. R. LIPSEY & P. STEINER, ECONOMICS 285-86, 390 (2d ed. 1969).
95. NonRubber Footwear, USITC Pub. 1717, Inv. No. TA-201-55, 64-67 (July 1985).
96. Id. at 65-67.
97. Id. at 66.
98. Id. at 68-69.
99. Id.
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firms showing lower profits.' °° Financial ratio analysis evidenced
fluctuating conditions, but a sharp decrease in the industry operating
income ratio, from 8.7% to 5.8% for the 1983-1984 period.101
When these figures were compared to the U.S. manufacturing in-
dustries average, the result was unfavorable. The operating income
ratio for the nonrubber footwear industry was a full 1% below the
U.S. average.10 2 These facts were considered sufficient to show that a
significant number of firms had failed to achieve a reasonable level of
profit. 103
The strength of this financial analysis consists in the considera-
tion given to rates of change in industry performance. The transition
between an orderly and disorderly adjustment can occur very quickly.
Thus, even one-year statistical movements of significant magnitude
may evidence serious injury or the threat thereof, and should not nec-
essarily be considered aberrations until a trend emerges. Given this,
Commissioner Eckes' point as to the historical nature of data used for
ITC determinations, which carry the risk of lagged perceptions, must
be borne in mind.'°4 Since there is no way to avoid the problem of
lagged perceptions, any sharp negative statistical movement in one or
more key indicators should, therefore, be considered a prima facie in-
dication that an industry transition is becoming disorderly, and that
there is a threat of serious injury.
Some of the deficiencies of using aggregate and individual firm
data have been noted. 05 In addition, the appropriateness of compari-
son to the U.S. manufacturing industries average is open to question.
This measure, since it is an average, necessarily implies that a signifi-
cant number of U.S. industries have financial results that are below
the average. Some of these industries may or may not face stiff import
competition, suggesting that the most relevant comparison is not be-
ing made, i.e., to industries which also face a meaningful degree of
import competition. Moreover, just because an industry's financial
results are below average, it does not necessarily follow that they are
achieving "unreasonably" low levels of profit. Although the owners
would prefer greater profits, this does mean that their profit level is
unreasonable because, in most cases, their capital is available for alter-
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 67.
105. See supra text following note 93.
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native use. Thus, it should be recognized that the comparison of the
financial data of any complaining industry to the U.S. manufacturing
industries average is, to a degree, arbitrary.
D. The Requirement of a "Threat" of Serious Injury
1. Statutory Framework
There is a threat of serious injury when serious injury is clearly
imminent if import trends continue unabated. 10 6 As with serious in-
jury, the indicia signaling a threat of serious injury lend themselves to
quantification. 107 However, the existence of these factors does not
necessarily flow from an increase in imports. Rather, they may arise
from a variety of other factors, e.g., changing consumer tastes, prod-
uct substitution, or inept management. 10 8 Accordingly, when rele-
vant, the ITC must consider such possibilities in its investigation, and
its report to the President must contain information on efforts made
by firms and workers to compete more effectively.10 9
The difficult question is determining when a threat of serious in-
jury is imminent. The thrust of section 201 and the legislative history
of the Act clearly suggest that the threat must be real, not speculative,
and highly probable, not merely possible. A threat, moreover, must
derive from a source exogenous to the domestic industry, increased
imports.
Accordingly, the determination of whether there is a threat of
serious injury should require a comparative analysis of the conditions
governing the domestic industry and the foreign industry. This type
of analysis will reveal the comparative advantages of foreign produ-
cers. Depending on the nature and degree of the advantage, this anal-
ysis will provide the basis for finding a threat of serious injury.
The results of this examination should condition the type of relief
afforded. If, on the one hand, the advantages revealed, such as lower
wage rates, can be expected to persist, adjustment assistance may be
more appropriate than the imposition of quotas or duties. On the
other hand, if the advantage revealed, access to cheaper raw materi-
106. S. REP., supra note 10, at 7265.
107. Trade Act of 1974 § 201(b)(2)(C), 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(2)(C) (Supp.II 1984); see also
supra text accompanying note 81. These factors include a decline in sales, a higher and grow-
ing inventory (whether maintained by domestic producers, importers, wholesalers, or retail-
ers), and a downward trend in production, profits, wages, or employment (or increasing
underemployment) in the domestic industry concerned.
108. S. REP., supra note 10, at 7265.
109. Trade Act of 1974 § 201(b)(5), 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(5) (1982).
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als, can be expected to dissipate over a reasonable time period, the
imposition of quotas or duties may be more appropriate relief than
adjustment assistance. In either case, however, the existence of for-
eign producer comparative advantage must make it highly probable
that the benefits of any advantage will in fact be realized.
2. The Case of NonRubber Footwear
Of the two Commissioners who found a threat of serious injury
confronting the nonrubber footwear industry,I10 only Vice Chairman
Liebeler offered a detailed explanation for this conclusion. Both
Commissioners based their views on the declining statistical trends in
production, capacity, utilization rates, financial performance, and the
rising number of plant closures and resulting unemployment.'II Basi-
cally, however, this data was symptomatic of the underlying cause,
the comparative labor cost advantage of foreign producers relative to
domestic producers. This advantage was revealed by an analysis of
the terms of foreign production. a12
Vice Chairman Liebeler examined footwear production factors in
Taiwan, and to a lesser extent, Korea. In 1984, these two countries
accounted for 59% of all footwear imports by volume, and 46% of all
footwear imports by value. With 52.3% of total domestic footwear
consumption by value given to imports in 1984, these two countries
represented 24% of the value of footwear sold in the United States, a
very substantial proportion of market share.113
Concerning Taiwan, several salient facts evidenced a threat to
the domestic nonrubber footwear industry. Taiwan is in the midst of
implementing a plan to develop high value added, leather, footwear
sales. 114 Over the period of 1980-1983, Taiwanese production of
leather footwear increased at a 46% annual rate. Taiwan's footwear
industry has developed sophisticated techniques for manufacturing
artificial leather. A large Italian leather firm announced plans to es-
tablish a processing plant in Taiwan, which is expected to boost the
quality of shoes made in Taiwan." 5 Furthermore, not only had Tai-
wan's production capacity and utilization rates grown materially
110. See supra note 33.
111. NonRubber Footwear, USITC Pub. 1717, Inv. No. TA-201-55, 35-38 (July 1985); see
also id. at 16-20.
112. See supra text following note 109.
113. NonRubber Footwear, USITC Pub. 1717, Inv. No. TA-201-55, 40 (July 1985).
114. Id. at 42.
115. Id.
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since 1980, but more significantly, its productivity grew at a 7.5%
annual rate during the 1982-1984 period.1 16 Finally, Taiwanese labor
costs are less than 25% of domestic labor costs. Insofar as labor in
the United States accounts for one-third of the cost of leather shoe
manufacture, these labor costs are an especially significant portion of
total production costs.117
Similar labor cost factors characterized shoe production in Ko-
rea. 18  Beyond these two countries, footwear manufacturing technol-
ogy is rapidly becoming available throughout the world. 119 Most
importantly, it is becoming available in those countries where labor
costs have historically been much lower than in the United States.
Thus, the comparative advantage of Taiwan and other countries
is not likely to diminish soon since it appears to be principally driven
by labor cost differentials. Given the high probability of a continuing
significant production cost advantage, therefore, the import of
nonrubber footwear constituted a threat of serious injury according to
Commissioners Liebeler and Stem. 120
E. The Requirement of "Substantial Cause"
1. Statutory Framework
The Act defines "substantial cause" as "a cause which is impor-
tant and not less than any other cause."' 21 A strict reading of this
definition would suggest that increased imports, which are but one of
a multitude of equal causes, would alone suffice as a substantial cause
116. Id. at 43.
117. Id. at 42 & n.54.
118. Id. at 43-44.
119. Id. at 44.
120. Id. at 15, 41 (conclusions of Commissioners Stern and Liebeler).
121. Trade Act of 1974 § 201(b)(4), 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(4) (1982). The use of the term
"substantial cause" reflects Congressional dissatisfaction with the prior requirement that im-
ports be the "major factor" in causing injury. See supra text accompanying note 73. The
major factor test was, in turn, linked to the most recently enacted trade agreement concessions
granted by the United States.
This linkage considerably narrowed the number of cases in which increased imports could
be found to cause serious injury. Of additional concern to Congress was the interpretation of
the term "major factor" (or "major cause") as "a cause greater than all others combined."
Such a standard proved unreasonably difficult to meet. Accordingly, use of the term "substan-
tial cause" indicates a relaxation of conditions for finding serious injury. This relaxation was
effected by severing the link between injury and imports arising from trade agreement conces-
sions. And use of this term indicates Congressional rejection of the notion that the cause of
injury must be "greater than all other causes combined." S. REP., supra note 10, at 7264,
7266.
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of injury. However, this reading has been expressly rejected by Con-
gress, and further explicit meaning has not been provided. 122
Although Congress did not intend that a mathematical formula
would determine "substantial cause,"' 12 3 the language of the statute
mandates a balancing process. 12 4 The requirement that increased im-
ports must be "not less than any other cause" to justify relief necessi-
tates consideration of all causes. Thus, a critical initial investigatory
problem is ensuring that all causes have been taken into account.
The ITC has taken basically two approaches in identifying all
causes. One approach is simply to catalogue them as specifically as
possible.1 25 While this may yield correct results, there are three po-
tential problems with this approach. First, all causes may not, in fact,
have been identified. Second, the causes which are identified may be
compared at different levels of generality.1 26 On the one hand, this
may result in double counting since some causes may overlap, and
thus could lead to an inappropriate affirmative injury determination.
On the other hand, comparison of causes at different levels of general-
ity may also lead to an inappropriate affirmative injury determination.
This may occur because disaggregated causes arising from domestic
sources will often tend to be overshadowed by the aggregate cause of
increased imports. Third, this approach relies, perhaps unnecessarily,
on subjective judgment in assessing the relative weight of causes.
The second approach of the ITC to ensure that all causes have
been considered, and one which avoids these problems, is to assess
causes under a generalized analysis of demand and supply. However,
two different macroeconomic models have been used for this purpose.
The effective difference between these models is material.
Under the so-called "shift-share" model, which is apparently los-
ing favor with some Commissioners, 27 only domestic demand and
foreign supply are analyzed. 28 This analysis attributes decreased do-
mestic production to increased imports. The shortcoming of this
analysis is that it wholly ignores domestic supply factors when analyz-
ing causation, and thus may lead to an unwarranted affirmative injury
determination.
122. S. REP., supra note 10, at 7264.
123. Id.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 57-58.
125. See, e.g., Carbon Steel, supra, note 3, at 90.
126. NonRubber Footwear, USITC Pub. 1717, Inv. No. TA-201-55, 45 n.62 (July 1985).
127. Id. at 71-72.
128. Id. at 49-50.
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The alternative macroeconomic model includes analysis of do-
mestic supply factors, in addition to domestic demand and foreign
supply. 129 This model, then, effectively captures all possible causes of
injury, and reveals, through graphic curve movements, whether im-
ports are the cause of injury.
Inclusion of domestic supply factors appears consistent with the
legislative intent. The legislative history cites several demand type
factors such as changes in consumer taste and technology, and substi-
tution, which, if found, would not justify import relief.130 Similarly, it
also cites a number of domestic supply type factors, plant obsoles-
cence and poor management, which if found, would also not justify
import relief. 3 1 Thus, Congress apparently intended that domestic
supply factors should be considered in determining if foreign supply is
a substantial cause of serious injury or the threat thereof.
Plainly, the determination of whether increased imports are a
substantial cause of injury remains a matter of judgment. Judgment
may vary depending on the method of analysis used, the factors in-
cluded for analysis, and the weight accorded the various factors con-
sidered. But this does not in any way reduce the ITC's burden of
demonstrating that increased imports are the substantial cause of ac-
tual or threatened serious injury when recommending import relief.
Accordingly, the ITC is urged to assure itself, and to document as
well as possible, that increased imports are in fact the substantial
cause of actual or threatened injury.'13 2
2. The Case of NonRubber Footwear
The unanimous ITC finding that increased imports of nonrubber
footwear were a substantial cause of serious injury or a threat thereof
was reached in two ways: on the basis of the declining market share
of domestic producers, and on the basis of a broader economic analy-
sis that included domestic supply factors.
As noted earlier, a decline in producer market share is one Con-
gressionally proffered indication of substantial cause. 133 This was the
129. Id. at 45-47. Vice Chairman Liebeler cites a number of reasons why this approach is
to be preferred, including: that it allows for the measurements of causes; it is quantitative and
does not rely on subjective judgment; it is transparent and easy to follow; it allows for predic-
tion; and it accords with intuitive notions of causation. Id. at 48-49.
130. S. REP., supra note 10, at 7265.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See supra text accompanying note 58.
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determining factor to three Commissioners. It was noted that from
1980-1984 imports had virtually doubled to 726 million pairs. This
entailed an increase in foreign producer market share from 49% in
1980, to 71% in 1984.134 By the measure of the value of goods sold,
imports in 1984 accounted for 54% of domestic consumption, up
from 34% in 1980.135 Thus, despite a large and rapid increase in do-
mestic demand from 1980-1984, domestic producers were unable to
share in any of the growth,' 3 6 even though the number of domestic
firms producing 500,000 pairs annually had decreased markedly since
1980. 137 Consequently, irrespective of other factors which may have
contributed to the problems of the domestic industry, i.e., changes in
fashions, the high value of the dollar, and domestic marketing deci-
sions, the "phenomenal" growth in imports in absolute terms over the
period covered by the investigation far outweighed any other cause in
the minds of three Commissioners. 13 8
This result was corroborated by a shift-share analysis, 139 made at
the request of Commissioner Eckes. He did not rely on this analysis,
however, because Congress had warned against the mathematical
weighing of causes, and the problems of inaccuracy regarding partial
year data. 40 Nonetheless, the shift-share analysis showed that for the
periods of 1980-1984 and 1983-1984 "all of the decline in overall do-
mestic production for the domestic market, during both time periods,
[was] attributable to the increase in market share of imports (apparent
U.S. consumption rose while domestic production declined)."' 4'
Vice Chairman Liebeler, in contrast, adhered to a
macroeconomic analysis as opposed to a statistical trend analysis.' 42
In this Commissioner's view, import relief can be recommended only
when foreign producers achieve either decreased costs or increased
productivity or both. 143 Here the evidence amply supported the find-
ing that foreign producer costs decreased and foreign producer pro-
ductivity increased.144 The data did not suggest any pronounced
134. NonRubber Footwear, USITC Pub. 1717, Inv. No. TA-201-55, 72 (July 1985).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 89.
137. Id. at 111.
138. Id. at 89.
139. See supra text accompanying note 128.
140. NonRubber Footwear, USITC Pub. 1717, Inv. No. TA-201-55, 72 (July 1985).
141. Id. at 71, 72 & n.16.
142. See supra text accompanying note 129.
143. NonRubber Footwear, USITC Pub. 1717, Inv. No. TA-201-55, 46-48 (July 1985).
144. Id. at 51-53.
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contraction of domestic demand or domestic supply. 45 Accordingly,
the increase in imports had to be attributable to the foreign supply
factors and were, therefore, the substantial cause of threatened serious
injury. 146
3. The Case of Carbon Steel
A majority of three Commissioners found that five industries suf-
fered actual or threatened serious injury.1 47 A fourth Commissioner,
Chairwoman Stem, used essentially the same criteria, but concluded
that imports of all product categories under investigation were not a
more important cause of injury than any other cause, and thus were
not the substantial cause of injury. 48  Vice Chairman Liebeler
reached this same conclusion using a different analysis. 49
The majority identified the following potential causes of injury:
cyclical changes in consumption; long-term changes in consumption
patterns; independent variables affecting industry conditions includ-
ing government regulations, intra-industry competition, management
decisions regarding raw material sourcing, labor contract provisions,
and investment decisions, and, finally, imports.1 50
The majority focused closely on three factors regarding those in-
dustries determined to have been injured. The first concerned trends
in import volumes. In each of the industries for which relief was rec-
ommended, imports had increased either in absolute terms' 5' or in
145. Id. at 52-53.
146. Id. at 53.
147. See supra note 42. Commissioners Lodwick and Rohr found that semi-finished steel
products faced a threat of serious injury, and the remaining four products had suffered actual
injury. Carbon Steel, supra note 3, at 56. However, they provided no analysis of the threat of
serious injury. Rather, they reasoned that the uncertainty created by changes in the historical
patterns in the market for this product indicated that a threat existed.
148. Carbon Steel, supra note 3, at 90-91.
149. Id. at 155; see also supra text accompanying note 129.
150. Carbon Steel, supra note 3, at 47-50.
151. These were semi-finished products, sheets and strip, and wire and wire products. Id.
at 55, 59, 61-62.
Concerning sheets and strip steel in particular, the majority rejected the argument made
by respondents that the long-term decline in demand was a more important cause of injury
than imports. Respondent's argument was based on the facts that auto imports had increased;
less steel was being used in domestically produced autos; average auto life was being extended
as a matter of consumer preference; and aluminum was being substituted for steel in the manu-
facture of cans. Id. at 60-61.
The majority rejected this argument based on its unwillingness to treat these facts as a
single cause, noting that an increase in auto imports does not have the same effect as using less
steel in the domestic manufacture of autos. Rather, it held that increased imports of autos are
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relative terms. 152 The second factor was the pricing practices for the
products concerned. Here it was found that the imported products in
all categories carried substantially lower prices than the same prod-
ucts domestically produced. 15 3 The third factor considered was the
relationship between the volume of imports and pricing practices as
affecting the financial performance of domestic producers. Here the
majority found a clear correlation between the volume and prices of
imports and the declining financial performance of the domestic
industry. 
54
Thus, it was clear in the majority's view that increased imports,
actual or relative to domestic production, were a more determinative
cause of injury than any other factor. The driving force behind this
paramount cause was lower prices.
Chairwoman Stem, though agreeing with the majority on the is-
sue of injury, departs on the issue of substantial cause. In so doing,
she identified six possible causes of injury. 55 Chairwoman Stern ob-
served that semi-finished products can only be used to produce addi-
tional goods. Thus, imports of cheaper semi-finished goods contribute
to the cost efficiency of domestic users who produce finished goods.
15 6
This efficiency will allow the domestic industry to invest in more ad-
vanced technology which will eventually enable it to overcome the
current advantage held by foreign producers.
Moreover, Chairwoman Stern also observed that the increase in
steel imports in 1981 was the result of a Canadian steel strike in that
a matter of changing consumer tastes which can vary quickly, whereas the amount of steel
used in autos is a long-term production cost consideration. Additionally, respondents had
failed to quantify the effect of a smaller volume of auto imports which are being priced sub-
stantially below domestically produced autos. Id. at 61.
While the majority's position on this point is, perhaps, supportable, there would seem to
be a relationship between auto imports and the amount of steel used in domestically produced
autos. In general, imported autos, particularly those from Japan, tend to be lighter and, there-
fore, more fuel efficient. Consequently, the decision of how much steel to use in domestically
produced autos is not merely a long-term cost consideration, but is also a management market-
ing decision concerning expected consumer preferences which auto management should take
into account. See supra text accompanying notes 130-31.
152. These were plates, structural shapes and units, and pipes and tubes. Carbon Steel,
supra note 3, at 56, 58, 61-64.
153. Id. at 56-64.
154. Id.
155. Chairwoman Stern cited to the following explanations for the steel industry's poor
performance since 1979: (1) long-term decline in demand; (2) unique short-term problems;
(3) intra-industry competition from cost efficient mini-mills; (4) an increasingly non-competi-
tive cost structure; (5) government regulation; and (6) the increase in imports. Id. at 90.
156. Id. at 105.
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year. Canadian firms exported semi-finished steel to the United States
for further processing and subsequently reimported the milled steel
products into Canada. 157 The 1982-83 level of imports also remained
relatively high. A material portion of the increase in imports was ac-
counted for by two domestic producers who elected to terminate do-
mestic production and to import to meet their needs.1 58
As to steel plate, Chairwoman Stern found the major cause of
injury to be deeply depressed general market conditions, even though
a long-term decline in the demand for plate was evident.159 Concern-
ing other product categories, there was also found to be a long-term
decline in demand which itself, or when coupled with other causes
such as intra-industry competition or the unusually deep cyclical
downturn in demand for the various products, was held to be the
most important cause of injury.' 6°
Vice Chairman Liebeler, in contrast to the other Commissioners,
applied a broad macroeconomic analysis to each product industry
under investigation.' 61 In no category of products did this analysis
show that imports were a more important cause of injury than domes-
tic demand or supply factors. 16 2 Although Vice Chairman Liebeler
found that seven product industries had suffered serious injury, in six
of these categories decreased domestic demand was found to be a
more important cause of injury than imports.' 63 In the seventh cate-
gory of semi-finished products, the very small portion of the domestic
market supplied by foreign producers suggested that imports could
not be the most important cause of injury.' 64 Thus, Commissioner
Liebeler could not recommend import relief for any product industry.
As to the preferred method of analysis in this case, the question
is essentially one of logic. Is it proper to compare the single factor of
foreign supply to domestic demand on an aggregate basis? Or is it
157. Id. at 103-104.
158. Id. at 104.
159. Id. at 105-106.
160. Id. at 107-117.
161. Id. at 143; see also supra text accompanying note 129.
162. Carbon Steel, supra note 3, at 155.
163. These were plates, id. at 146; sheet and strip, id. at 147; wire and wire products, id. at
149-50; railway-type products, id. at 151; structural shapes and units, id. at 153-54; and pipes
and tubes, id. at 154-55.
Additionally, in four of these categories (plates, structural shapes and units, railway-type
products, and pipes and tubes) imports had not increased in absolute terms. See supra text
accompanying note 76.
164. Carbon Steel, supra note 3, at 144-45.
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more proper to compare the single factor of foreign supply to each
specific factor affecting domestic demand? An affirmative answer to
the former question would yield fewer recommendations of relief,
while an affirmative answer to the latter question would result in more
recommendations of relief because the aggregate cause of foreign sup-
ply will tend to overshadow the specific factors affecting domestic
demand.
A comparison of aggregate foreign supply to aggregate domestic
demand would appear to be the better view. This is because foreign
supply represents a collection of specific factors, i.e., labor, material,
energy, transportation costs, the cost of capital, etc. In any rational
comparison, likes must be compared to likes, aggregates to aggre-
gates. To compare the aggregate cause of foreign supply to the spe-
cific factors affecting domestic demand, therefore, violates a basic
principle of rational inquiry and may lead to inappropriate recom-
mendations for relief from imports.
CONCLUSION
This analysis of the key provisions of sections 201-203 of the
Trade Act of 1974, as amended, and recent opinions of the Interna-
tional Trade Commission reveals that a high, but not insuperable,
standard for obtaining relief from imports has been established. This
standard can be met by establishing a substantial link between an ac-
tual or imminently threatened injury and a proportionate growth in
market share by foreign producers. The recommendations by the ITC
in NonRubber Footwear and Carbon Steel indicate that this causal
connection can be established when foreign producers have the com-
parative advantage of lower production costs, which generally trans-
lates into lower product prices. It is these lower product prices which
enable foreign producers to gain market share relative to domestic
producers producing a like or directly competitive product. If, as a
result of lower prices for foreign-produced goods, the domestic indus-
try cannot make an orderly adjustment to the new conditions of com-
petition, relief from these imports may be recommended by the ITC.
The thrust of the analysis also reveals that the ITC has come to
certain settled approaches to the substantive issues presented by the
Trade Act of 1974. However, other substantive issues are left un-
resolved by imprecise statutory language and its legislative history. It
is clear that much of the substance of this legislation is left to the
discretionary judgment of the ITC.
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The drawback of this imprecision and reliance on the judgment
of the ITC is that it creates uncertainty for those parties for whose
benefit the legislation was enacted, making the availability of a rem-
edy difficult to predict. The value of this deference to the ITC, how-
ever, is that it permits flexibility in response to the varying and
shifting conditions of the marketplace. Thus, it gives both the ITC
and petitioners the opportunity to tailor, within reasonable limits,
their interpretations of this legislation to the facts of individual cases.
Theodore L. Cheslak

